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tABSTRACT
Coordinating the timing and location of new production facilities is 
one of the challenges of liberalized power sectors. It is complicated by 
the presence of transmission bottlenecks, oligopolistic competition, 
and the unknown prospects of low-carbon technologies. We build 
a model encompassing a late and early investment stage, a clean 
(green) and dirty (brown) technologies, and a single transmission 
bottleneck and compare dynamic efficiency of several market designs. 
Allocating network access on a short-term competitive basis distorts 
investment decisions as brown firms will pre-empt green competitors 
by investing early. Compensating early investors for future network 
congestion, as for instance in the E.U., only exacerbates this problem. 
Dynamic efficiency is restored with long-term transmission rights 
that can be traded on a secondary market (iusvendendi). As early 
investment lowers the resale value of the transmission rights, brown 
firms will invest optimally. We show that dynamic efficiency does not 
require the existence of physical rights for accessing the transmission 
line (ius utendi), but financial rights on receiving the scarcity revenues 
generated by the transmission line (ius fructendi) suffice.
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1 Introduction1
Before the liberalization of the energy sector, generation investments were centrally planned
and coordinated. This implied that interactions between diﬀerent power plants through
network constraints were fully taken into account during investment appraisals. Indeed, be-
cause of transmission constraints, operating a new power plant may require existing plants
to cut-back production and preclude otherwise proﬁtable future investments. In a liber-
alized market, investment coordination takes place through the market and transmission
market design needs to induce ﬁrms to internalize those interaction eﬀects.
We build a bare-bones model to compare diﬀerent transmission market designs taking
into account the dynamic nature of generation investments. The set-up of the model is
inspired by current power markets, which are characterized by oligopolistic competition
and a drive for low-carbon but capital intensive technologies whose future costs are still
uncertain. In order to model the dynamic interaction of investments we develop a two-stage
entry game with two ﬁrms: a ﬁrst-mover (the 'brown' incumbent) and a second mover (the
'green' entrant). The brown incumbent uses a mature conventional production technology
such as coal or natural gas with known low investment costs and a high marginal fuel cost.
The green entrant uses a low-carbon technology such as wind or solar power which will
only become available in the second stage. Its investment costs are initially unknown. The
timing is as follows: In period 1, the incumbent decides whether to invest immediately
or to delay its decision until period 2. The entrant only decides on investing in period 2.
The transmission bottleneck is modeled as a single line which ﬁrms need to use to reach
consumers. Its capacity is such that it can only transport the production output of single
ﬁrm. The bottleneck is owned by a regulated network owner, who always makes available
all transmission capacity to the market.
This set-up provides for some interesting features. (1) In the ﬁrst period, the incum-
bent faces a real option problem on whether to it invest or delay the investment decision.
Strategic considerations might lead the incumbent to invest early in order to deter entry.
How do we ensure that incumbent's decisions are socially eﬃcient? (2) Once the entrant
has installed its production plant, it can out-compete the incumbent to access the bot-
tleneck, as its energy is available for free. The incumbent's power plant then becomes
obsolete. Should the incumbent be compensated for its stranded assets, as it has lost its
1We are very grateful to Claude Crampes, Luciano De Castro, Lin Fan and Bruno Jullien for discussing
earlier versions of our paper, and thank Justin Dijk, Richard Green, Thomas-Olivier Le´autier, Matti Liski,
David Newbery, Patrick Rey, Francois Salanie´, Jean Tirole, Georg Zachmann, Gijsbert Zwart as well as
the participants at the Conference on the Economics of Energy Markets at Toulouse, the Conference on the
Applied Infrastructure Research at Berlin, the Annual Conference of the French Economic Association at
Paris, the Young Energy Engineers and Economists Seminar at Cambridge, the TSE Student Workshop, the
Mannheim Energy Conference, the Cologne Energy Summer, the European Economic Association Meeting,
the European Association for Industrial Economics Meeting and the TSE Applied Theory Workshop for
their helpful and insightful comments. Georgios Petropoulos gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support
of Essent NV, provided through the Tilec-Essent co-operation project. Bert Willems was paid by a
Marie Curie fellowship. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors, who accept sole
responsibility for the contents as well as any mistakes, errors or omissions therein.
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implied right on network capacity?
We consider three market designs. The ﬁrst design, the nodal spot market, consists of
a short-term market in which an auctioneer jointly clears energy and transmission markets
after collecting producers' supply oﬀers and consumers' demand bids. In this design there
are no long-term property rights for transmission. In the second design a long-term ﬁnancial
transmission right market is added to the nodal spot market. The owner of a ﬁnancial
transmission rights (FTR) receives the revenues that are generated by selling access to the
bottleneck in the nodal sport market. Hence, the owner receives the proceeds generated by
the transmission line (ius fructendi), but cannot aﬀect who will use the transmission line as
this is determined by the auctioneer. The third design has long-term physical transmission
rights for the bottleneck. The owner of the physical rights can decide whether to use or
not use the bottleneck capacity (ius utendi). In the latter two designs transmission rights
are long-term, that is they cover two investment periods. They are allocated before the
ﬁrst stage in a primary market. If resale is allowed (ius vendendi) the transmission rights
can be resold in a secondary transmission market.
With nodal spot pricing, the incumbent will invest too often for the following two rea-
sons. The incumbent does not fully internalize the social real option value of waiting,
as it does not internalize the proﬁt of the entrant and the congestion revenue collected
by the network owner. Moreover, it will strategically enter early to deter entry and re-
duce competition. Compensating the incumbent by for instance grandfathering long-term
non-tradable ﬁnancial transmission rights to the incumbent, only exacerbates this prob-
lem. The intuition is the following: Financial transmission right will only be valuable
if there is competition for using the bottleneck. Hence, the incumbent will invest early,
as this increases competition. Dynamic eﬃciency can be restored by allowing the resale
of transmission rights. As early investment lowers the resale value of the transmission
rights, the incumbent will delay investments to the socially optimal level. By reselling a
physical transmission right, the incumbent can extract the entrant's proﬁts and therefore
internalizes the entrant's proﬁt. We show that dynamic eﬃciency does not require those
long-term transmission rights to be physical. Also with ﬁnancial transmission rights we
obtain dynamic eﬃciency. If the incumbent would not have full bargaining power in the
secondary market, it will not fully extract the proﬁts of the entrant and the outcome is not
dynamically eﬃcient. However, dynamic eﬃciency can be restored, if transmission rights
are auctioned in the primary market.
Related literature
The set-up of our model is somewhat similar to Aghion and Bolton (1987), in which an
incumbent and a consumer sign an exclusive long term contract with a penalty for breach,
in order to extract rents from a entrant with unknown production costs. By signing the
exclusivity contract, the entrant, if it enters, is obliged to sell at a low price in order
to compensate the consumer for penalty of breaching the contract with the incumbent.
Hence, jointly the incumbent and the consumer can extract some of the eﬃciency gains
from the entrant. However, as a result some eﬃcient entry is deterred. Also in our model
the incumbent faces an entrant with unknown production costs, and can foreclose entry by
obtaining a physical transmission contract. However, the incumbent does not negotiate a
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contract with consumers, but it buys the contract from an independent network operator
and the entrant does not bargain with consumers about the price of its goods, but with
the incumbent for obtaining the transmission access.2 Moreover, bargaining between the
incumbent and the entrant is assumed to be eﬃcient, and therefore, in contrast to Aghion
and Bolton (1987) entry is always ex-post eﬃcient. The sharing of the bargaining surplus
aﬀects the incentives for the incumbent to invest in the ﬁrst stage (which is not covered
by Aghion and Bolton). The larger the incumbent's share of the bargaining surplus, the
more it will internalize the entrant's proﬁts, and the less incentives the incumbent has to
deter entry by investing early. Summarizing, it is more eﬃcient to use the transmission
contract to extract rents from the entrant, than to over-invest in the ﬁrst stage. Such
transmission rights might therefore improve long term eﬃciency. Interestingly, even if the
incumbent has no full bargaining power in the secondary market, (and cannot fully extract
the entrant's rents), eﬃciency is restored if rights are allocated initially in a competitive
primary market.
Given irreversibly of investments the incumbent faces a real option problem in the ﬁrst
stage (Dixit and Pindyk, 1994). We show that strategic considerations reduce the real
option value of delaying investments and creates a ﬁrst mover beneﬁt for the incumbent,
which both lead to investments which are earlier than socially optimal. This is similar
to Grenadier (2002) who shows that competition reduces real option values in a Cournot
framework, which leads to earlier investments.3 However, our setting diﬀers as we study
diﬀerent transmission market designs.
Our paper is linked to the literature on property rights, nuisance and compensation,
which studies for instance whether an airport should compensate residents living around the
airport for noise pollution, even if those residents arrive after the airport's establishment.4
Pitchford and Snyder (2003) show that allocating the property rights to the ﬁrst mover
(the airport) eliminates underinvestments by the ﬁrst mover due to a hold-up problem
(and hence justify the legal coming to the nuisance doctrine). However, it might lead to
overinvestment by the ﬁrst mover, as early investments improves its bargaining position
vis-a-vis the residents. In some cases it might therefore be optimal to allocate rights the
second mover (the residents). We extend the model by Pitchford and Snyder by allowing
for trade of property rights both in the primary and the secondary market, by considering
additional property rights regimes such as ﬁnancial transmission rights, and by considering
ﬁrms that compete in the same product market (and hence externalities are market based).
Our paper is indirectly linked to the literature of property rights, takings and com-
pensation, which studies whether a ﬁrm that invests on land which is subsequently taken
by government for other use, should receive a compensation for its sunk investments. In
2Note that in our model consumers are indiﬀerent regarding the investment decisions of incumbent and
entrant, as they are assumed to be located in a large competitive high cost market downstream of the
bottleneck. Their energy price depends on those local production costs, but not on upstream competition.
They are therefore modeled as passive participants.
3Similarly, Leahy (1993) shows that price-taking perfectly competitive ﬁrms will time their investments
according to the social optimum, and can rely on an NPV rule.
4See also Wittman (1980, 1981)
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practice, many incumbent generators built power plants in a pre-liberalization era, where
network access was guaranteed by the regulator and subsidies for renewable energy were
small or non-existent. When governments liberalized markets, introduced regulated net-
work access, and massively subsidized green energy, the incumbent would often (implicitly)
loose its access right. The standard result of the literature in such a situation is the zero
compensation result (Blume et al. 1984 and Fischel and Shapiro, 1989): the government
should not compensate the incumbent ﬁrm. The intuition behind this surprising result is
that when the investor decides to invest, she is aware of the possibility that its property
(the land or the access right) will be taken by the government and hence, she fully inter-
nalizes the potential loss of the capital when she makes her investment decision. If instead
compensation would have been given for the taking, the investor underestimates the poten-
tial loss of taking and overinvests. In many power markets, governments recognize those
historical access rights by grandfathering transmission rights to the ﬁrm once it invests.
We show that this type of compensation will result in overinvestment as predicted by the
earlier literature. However, we also derive that if the compensation is made tradable in
a secondary market, the Fischel and Shapiro result no longer holds, as the eﬀect on the
resale value reduces the incentives for early investments by the incumbent, which might
restore eﬃciency. Hence, consideration regarding compensation and eﬃciency do no longer
conﬂict.
Policy relevance. Many mature power markets use a single centralized auction to
jointly clear short-term energy and transmission markets. In its purest form, the auction
results in a diﬀerent energy price for each network node and time period (nodal pricing).5
Most U.S. power markets use this design. For political reasons, many European markets
use a variation of this auction design in which prices can vary across geographical areas,
but not within areas. Hence prices are not nodal but zonal. Our simpliﬁed model is
representative for bottlenecks between nodes as well as between zones.
As markets evolve, often a system of ﬁnancial transmission rights is introduced.6 Those
rights are used by market participants to manage the risk of their contracting and gener-
ation portfolio.7 Financial transmission rights are typically sold on a centralized primary
5The auctioneer selects the lowest cost bids that balance energy supply and demand in each node given
the transmission constraints and the physical laws governing the network ﬂows. The market clearing price
in a node is equal to the marginal cost of supplying energy to that node. Diﬀerences between nodal prices
give rise to a trading surplus, which is collected by the network operator in the form of congestion rents on
the transmission lines. One of the ﬁrst advocates for nodal pricing in energy markets were Schweppe et al.
(1988). Wilson (2002) argues that such a central design is necessary for short-term operational eﬃciency
given the large number of inter-dependencies.
6Those rights are known under diﬀerent names: Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) in PJM, New
England and Midwest markets; Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCCs) in the New York market;
Congestion Revenue Rights (CRRs) in California and Texas; Transmission Congestion Rights (TCRs) in
the Southwest Power Pool.
7For instance, a generator with production location A might sell a ﬁnancial forward contract to con-
sumers in location B. While this contract will fully hedge consumers against spot price ﬂuctuations in their
location, the generator will still face some basis risk. That is, spot prices in location A and B might not
be perfectly correlated. A ﬁnancial transmission rights allows the generator to hedge this basis risk.
Financial Transmission Rights could also be used to improve regulation of transmission investments as
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market and can then be re-traded in a secondary market. Sometimes they are also grand-
fathered to historical network users.8 In our paper we study both grandfathering as well
as a primary market for ﬁnancial transmission rights.
Some early power markets, often without well-developed spot markets, rely on a system
of physical transmission rights. The owners of those rights can transport electricity across
transmission bottlenecks. Gradually those physical transmission rights are being phased
out, and they often receive properties that make them more alike ﬁnancial rights. For
instance, physical transmission rights now often come with use-it-or-loose-it rules, which
frees transmission capacity that remains unscheduled for usage in the short term spot
market.9 We model the physical transmission right in its purest form, in which they can
be used to exclude ﬁrms from using transmission capacity.
For bottlenecks within a zone, European markets use a special market design called
counter trading. Under counter trading the energy market ﬁrst clears as if there are
no transmission bottlenecks within the area. Then, after market clearing, the network
operator will manage congestion by paying some generators to reduce their production
and others to increase production. We do not explicitly model counter trading, because in
our setting it is equivalent to grandfathering non-tradable ﬁnancial transmission rights to
the incumbent. This leads to overinvestment by the incumbent. See also Dijk and Willems
(2011) and Lazarcyk and Holmberg (2015).
To the best of our knowledge no other study on transmission market design studies
the long-run eﬃciency of transmission contracts while explicitly modeling market power,
dynamic investments and uncertainty. In a monopoly model without investments, Joskow
and Tirole (2000) show that ﬁnancial transmission rights are operationally, in the short-
run, more eﬃcient than physical transmission rights, as it allows for risk hedging, without
allowing the monopolist to strategically foreclose its home market by withholding transmis-
sion capacity. Introducing a use-it-or-loose-it rule with the physical transmission rights
eliminates this competitive concern. They also stress the importance of the speciﬁc design
of the primary auction for transmission rights.10 In contrast to Joskow and Tirole, we
assume that the incumbent and the entrant are investing in the same location and com-
pete for using the transmission line. Hence, although the incumbent can still foreclose the
they provide information about (future) transmission service demand. (Henze et al., 2012 and Rosell3n
and Weigt , 2011). For an early and more in depth discussion of FTRs see Hogan (1992). Rosell3n
and Kristiansen (2013) review the experiences and the theoretical foundations of Financial Transmission
Rights.
8For instance in the Midwest ISO, ﬁrms receive Auction Revenue Rights based on their historical
network usage. Those ARRs are similar to long-term FTRs and can each year be converted into short-
term FTRs (if certain feasibility constraints are satisﬁed), or provide its owners a fraction of the auction
revenue of short-term FTRs.
9In meshed networks FTRs and PTRs also diﬀer in their presentation of the network structure. FTRs
are deﬁned independent of the network topology as point-to-point transmission rights. PTRs are link-based
and reﬂect the actual transmission lines more directly. FTRs often take the form of forward contracts,
while PTRs are option contracts. As we do not focus on meshed networks, we refer to Hogan (1992) for a
more in depth discussion.
10Gilbert, Neuhoﬀ and Newbery (2004) extend this model to an oligopoly setting.
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entrant by buying transmission rights, the incumbent is not trying to protect its home
market.
Oxera (2003) estimates that around 80% of the beneﬁts of locational signals result from
the long-term eﬀect of plant siting. Hence, only 20% comes from the short-term operational
optimization of existing plants. This shows that the long-term eﬀects that are the focus of
this paper are very relevant. Lapuerta and Harris (2004) stress that those locational signals
should reﬂect no more and no less than the cost to the transmission network of a siting
decision. In our model we show that without transmission rights such a locational signal
should take into account the real option value of alternative usages of the transmission
line, and does not need to be related to the cost of investing in transmission capacity.
Rious et al. (2009) show that the lumpiness in transmission investments greatly decreases
diﬀerences in nodal prices with ineﬃcient plant siting as a result. They therefore argue
for an additional connection charge. Also in our model we obtain ineﬃcient investments
with nodal pricing, but the introduction of tradable long term transmission rights restores
eﬃciency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework
of our model while section 3 investigates the eﬃciency of nodal spot pricing, with and
without tradable ﬁnancial and physical transmission rights. Section 4 discusses alternative
sharing rules of the main model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider an electricity market with one low cost, export-constrained generation area in the
North and one large, high cost import-constrained area in the South that are connected by a
transmission line with capacity K. Consumers are located exclusively in the South and are
supplied by competitive retail companies which buy energy on the local wholesale market.
Production in the South is competitive, and occurs at (high) marginal cost CS. Demand
in the South is high and exceeds the capacity of the transmission line. Hence, energy
imports from the North are insuﬃcient to meet demand, and additional production by
southern generators is always necessary.11 We develop a two-period stochastic investment
model in which two ﬁrms, the incumbent (I) and the entrant (E), consider investing in
the northern location. Production in the North is cost eﬃcient, but transmission capacity
limits business opportunities. The two ﬁrms have access to technologies which diﬀer in
maturity and cost structure. The entrant uses an innovative technology (for instance oﬀ-
shore wind), which becomes available only in period 2, has low marginal cost, and, initially,
uncertain investment costs. The incumbent uses a mature technology (such as a natural
gas power plant) which is available already in period 1. Investments are assumed to be
lumpy. Firms invests either a capacity equal to the size of the transmission line, K, or
11More precisely, with K units consumed in the South, the marginal willingness-to-pay of consumers
exceeds the production and retail costs , i.e. Pcons(K) > CS + Cretail, with Pcons(·) the inverse demand
function of consumers.
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nothing at all.12
The incumbent and the entrant have marginal costs c and d, and (per unit) investment
costs F and G, respectively. The entrant has lower marginal cost than the incumbent
(c − d = ∆c > 0), and its ﬁxed cost G is initially treated as a continuous stochastic
variable on support [0, G] with cumulative density Φ(G). The distribution function of G is
common knowledge. Total production cost in the North is always lower than the marginal
production cost in the South, and for high realizations of G, the innovative technology is
more expensive than the mature technology (c+ F < d+G < CS ),
Competition and investment in the North depend on transmission access regulation
and the accompanying property rights regime. In what follows, we examine three three
transmission mechanisms: (1) Nodal pricing, (2) Nodal pricing with ﬁnancial transmission
rights, and (3) Physical transmission rights. The mechanisms diﬀer in whether we consider
long-term transmission rights and whether these long-term rights are physical or ﬁnancial.
We also study how the existence of a secondary market for the trade of long-term rights
and the way that the rights are initially allocated aﬀect investment incentives.
Under nodal pricing, the transmission line is managed by the transmission system
operator (TSO) who dispatches generators based upon their bids to supply generation
services so as to balance the supply and demand for generation services in an eﬃcient
manner taking into account physical constraints on the transmission network. Nodal energy
prices are determined by local demand and supply conditions and import (or export) levels.
Diﬀerences in locational prices can vary widely over time. When there is no congestion on a
transmission network, there is only one price on the interconnected system.13 By contrast,
if transmission lines are congested, the marginal energy prices will vary per location (node)
and over time. The diﬀerence between locational prices represent the congestion charges,
which are collected by the transmission system operator as scarcity rents.
In the setup of our paper nodal pricing implies the following: The incumbent and
the entrant compete a´ la Bertrand for supplying energy services in the North. The TSO
dispatches the generator with the lowest bid in the North, (unless this bid exceeds the
marginal cost CS in which case no generator is dispatched in the North). This generator
receives a (per unit) payment equal to its bid b. The TSO pays the generator the price b
for energy production, transports energy from North to South, receives the price CS from
retailers, and collects the congestion charge K(CS − b), the merchandizing surplus.
Locational price variation in a nodal pricing model creates a demand by risk-averse
agents for instruments to hedge against price ﬂuctuations. One of the instruments to hedge
against price ﬂuctuations is called ﬁnancial transmission rights (FTRs). FTRs insure the
12Investment lumpiness is a simplifying assumption. It is realistic for suﬃciently small transmission
lines, because there are economies of scale in building generation capacity both on plant and site level.
Obviously, it is never optimal to build more than the capacity of the transmission line. As an extention
of the main model, we investigate how allowing generators to have capacity lower than the transmission
of the transmission line aﬀect the main results of our study. As we will see to great extent, the results
remain qualitatively the same.
13We ignore Joule transmission losses in the system (i.e. electrical energy dissipating in the transmission
lines as heat). If those losses are taken into account, location prices will reﬂect those transmission losses.
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incumbent (or the entrant) against regional price diﬀerences and the associated congestion
charges. In particular, these rights give the holders a ﬁnancial claim on the congestion
rents created when the network is constrained. In this paper, FTRs are auctioned or
grandfathered to either the incumbent or the entrant at the start of the game. The eﬀect
of FTRs is that in case the holder faces competition, it is compensated for lower energy
prices in the North as it receives the congestion rents. In case the holder is less eﬃcient
than the rival ﬁrm, in equilibrium, it is compensated for not producing. The holder of the
rights has the option to resell them to its rival ﬁrm.
An alternative regulatory model for network access is a system of physical transmission
rights (PTRs). Under this approach, network access and congestion pricing are decen-
tralized and only the holders of physical transmission rights are allowed to use congested
transmission lines. Speciﬁcally, the physical capacity of all potentially congested interfaces
is determined by the TSO, and property rights to use this capacity are deﬁned and allo-
cated to network users. A ﬁrm must possess a physical right to transport over the congested
interface. The markets for these physical rights then determine the market-clearing prices
for congestion. In this paper, PTRs are long-term, and therefore, give their holder the
right to withhold access to its transmission property even when it decides not to enter the
market. The property rights of the transmission line are auctioned either to the incumbent
or the entrant at the start of the game. The holder of the rights has the option to resell
them to its rival ﬁrm instead of using the line itself when it is proﬁtable.
The timing of the game diﬀers slightly between the three scenarios
• Before period 1, long-term transmission rights are allocated to a potential generator
of the North. These transmission rights can be either PTRs or FTRs. In the absence
of such rights the game starts in period 1 directly.
• Period 1: The incumbent chooses whether to enter the market by paying a ﬁxed cost
F or to wait. In case it enters it makes a per unit ﬁrst period proﬁt µ.14 Between
period 1 and 2, nature draws the ﬁxed cost G of the entrant. The realization of G
is common knowledge. In the PTR and FTR scenarios, following the realization of
G, the owner of the long-term rights may make a take-it-or-leave sales oﬀer to its
competitor. The competitor accepts or rejects this oﬀer.
• Period 2: The entrant and the incumbent (in the case that it did not enter the
market in the ﬁrst period) simultaneously decide whether they will enter the market.
Note that when the incumbent enters in period 1, it remains in the market for the
second period of the game without having the option to exit, so, in this case, in the
second period, there is only one entry decision (to be made by the entrant).15 In the
14In the nodal pricing and FTR scenario, the incumbent submits an energy bid to the TSO for producing
electricity. In equilibrium the TSO dispatches the incumbent and the transmission lines is used. In the
PTR scenario, the incumbent will only enter if it owns PTRs. In that case the incumbent produces and
transports energy to the South.
15For certain cost parameters, the simultaneous entry game might have multiple Nash equilibria. In pure
strategies there are two Nash equilibria. One in which only the entrant enters and another one where only
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nodal pricing and FTR scenario, ﬁrms choose their pricing behavior in the resulting
Bertrand game. The TSO dispatches the ﬁrm with the lowest price bid. In the PTR
scenario, a ﬁrm that owns PTRs and invested in production capacity supplies energy
to the South directly.
Both ﬁrms discount proﬁts with discount factor δ < 1. In addition, we assume that the
incumbent cannot proﬁtably enter the market unless it is active during the second period.
Hence, its ﬁrst period proﬁt, µ is smaller than its investment cost F (µ < F ).16 However,
the incumbent's ﬁrst period proﬁt outweighs the extra capital costs of investing in period
1 (F ) instead of delaying the investment until period 2 (δF ). Hence,
F > µ > (1− δ)F (1)
which implies that F − µ < δF . In the absence of strategic interactions, the incumbent
always invests in period 1.
Before analyzing the investment strategies of the incumbent and the entrant in the
three scenarios we ﬁrst develop the social planner's investment policy as a benchmark
case. Investment in the ﬁrst period is socially optimal if the social beneﬁt from investing
is larger than the beneﬁt from waiting. The social planner's payoﬀ equals the sum of
the incumbent's and the entrant's proﬁts and the beneﬁt received by the TSO, i.e. its
merchandising surplus. For a given ﬁxed level of demand (given the ﬁxed equilibrium price
in the South), the optimal social outcome corresponds to the minimum total expected
production cost. By investing in North, expensive production in the South can be avoided,
but additional investment costs might be incurred. Hereafter, without loss of generality,
we normalize the transmission capacity at K = 1.
Proposition 1. Investment in period 1 is socially optimal if and only if the social value
of early investment is positive:
∆VSP = µ− (1− δ)F︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
− δ
ˆ ∆c
0
F dΦ(G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIa
+
ˆ ∆c+F
∆c
(F + ∆c−G) dΦ(G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IIb
 > 0 (2)
Proof. The expected cost reduction of investing early in the mature technology early is
equal to:
V InvestSP = (µ− F ) + δ
[ˆ ∆c
0
(CS − d−G)dΦ(G) +
ˆ G
∆c
(CS − c) dΦ(G)
]
the incumbent enters. We assume that the ﬁrms co-ordinate on the pure Nash equilibrium that implies
the lowest total cost. Hence, coordination failures in the second stage are not the source of ineﬃciencies
in the model.
16Let for example, periods 1 and 2 have a duration D1 and D2, respectively. The duration of the second
period is normalized to D2 = 1, while the ﬁrst period is shorter (D1 < 1). Then, the ﬁrst period proﬁt is
µ ≡ D1(CS − c)K. So, this consideration implies that the duration of the ﬁrst period is suﬃciently small.
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The ﬁrst term represents social value of the ﬁrst period cost reduction µ and the investment
cost F . In the second period, the innovative technology will be used if G < ∆c, in which
case the cost reduction is equal to c − d − G. For higher cost realizations the mature
technology remains in use, and the cost advantage is Cs − c.
The expected cost reduction of with delayed investment decisions is equal to:
V WaitSP = δ
[ˆ ∆c+F
0
(CS − d−G)dΦ(G) +
ˆ G
∆c+F
(CS − c− F ) dΦ(G)
]
There is no cost reduction in the ﬁrst period. In the second period the innovative technology
will be used whenever G < ∆c+F , in which case the cost advantage is CS−d−G, otherwise
the mature technology is optimal, with cost advantage Cs−c−F . Investing early is socially
optimal whenever ∆VSP = V
Invest
SP − V WaitSP > 0, which simpliﬁes to equation (2).
In expression (2), part I is the net present value of an early investment. By investing
earlier, the ﬁrm generates proﬁt µ but the investment cost is incurred earlier, so there is
a loss: (1 − δ)F . Given assumption (1) this term is positive. Parts IIa and IIb represent
the social real option value of waiting. By investing in period 1, one forgoes the beneﬁt
of learning more about the future cost G. Ex-post, if one learns that the cost of the
entrant G is low, it would have been cheaper to let the entrant produce. If the entrant
is very eﬃcient, G < ∆c, one will no longer use the incumbent's technology, and the
investment cost F is sunk. While if the investments costs of the entrant are intermediate,
∆c < G < F + ∆c, the incumbent's investment will be used, but the entrant would have
had a lower total production cost. Hence learning could have lowered total production
costs with (c+ F )− (d+G).
It is straightforward from (2) that early investment becomes more attractive for a higher
discount rate δ, higher ﬁrst period proﬁt µ, and lower investments cost F. Note that if there
are no irreversible costs are incurred (F = 0), then the real option value (term IIa+IIb)
becomes zero.
3 Analysis
This section investigates how access regulation aﬀects the incumbent's and the entrant's
investment strategies for the scenarios described above.
3.1 Nodal Pricing
Given our assumptions, and conditional on the ﬁrst period investment, we will show that
the second period investments are eﬃcient. So, dynamic eﬃciency depends on whether
private incentives for investment in period 1 coincide with the social investment incentives.
Proposition 2 summarizes those investment decisions.
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Proposition 2. Under nodal pricing, the incumbent invests in period 1 if and only if
∆ΠNP = µ− (1− δ)F︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
−δ
ˆ ∆c
0
F dΦ(G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
+δ
ˆ ∆c+F
∆c
(CS − c− F ) dΦ(G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
III
> 0 (3)
Proof. We derive the equilibrium by backward induction and start with the bidding equi-
librium in the second stage. If the incumbent and the entrant are both present in the
market, there is Bertrand price competition for selling energy to the TSO. In equilibrium,
both ﬁrms submit bids equal to the marginal cost of the most expensive ﬁrm (the incum-
bent), and the TSO dispatches the ﬁrm with the lowest marginal cost (the entrant). The
second stage operational proﬁt of the incumbent, (i.e. proﬁt net of investment cost) is
zero, and of the entrant, it is ∆c. If a single ﬁrm is present in the market, there is no
competitive pressure. Without competition the incumbent has operational proﬁt CS − c,
and the entrant CS − d.
We now turn to the second stage investment equilibrium. First, assume that the in-
cumbent has invested in period 1, and that the entrant decides whether to invest in period
2. Note that at the start of period 2, the realization of G is common knowledge. The
entrant's decision is straightforward, it invests whenever operational proﬁt outweighs in-
vestment costs ∆c > G. The (expected) proﬁt of the incumbent when it invests in the ﬁrst
stage is therefore equal to
ΠInvestNP = (µ− F ) + δ
ˆ G
∆c
(CS − c) dΦ(G),
the sum of ﬁrst period proﬁt and the expected second period operational proﬁt. As oper-
ational proﬁts are zero whenever G < ∆c, the lower bound of the integral is ∆c. Second,
assume that the incumbent has not invested in period 1, and that the entrant and the
incumbent simultaneously decide whether to enter and invest in period 2. Depending on
the realization of G this game may have several equilibria. For G < ∆c, investment is a
dominant strategy for the entrant and the incumbent will not invest. For higher investment
costs (G > ∆c) the game is similar to a game of chicken, with two pure Nash equilibria
in which only one ﬁrm invests. We assume that in those cases, the ﬁrms coordinate on
the Nash equilibrium which gives the highest social surplus.17 Hence the entrant invests
when G < F + ∆c and the incumbent when G > F + ∆c in which case it makes a proﬁt
(CS− c−F ). The (expected) proﬁt of the incumbent when it delays investment is equal to
ΠWaitNP = δ
ˆ G¯
∆c+F
(CS − c− F )dΦ(G)
The incumbent will invest in stage one if it is proﬁtable to do so: ∆ΠNP = Π
Invest
NP −
ΠWaitNP > 0, which simpliﬁes to (3).
17The game of chicken has equilibria which do not maximize total surplus. Here, we make the most
favorable assumption for nodal pricing to be an eﬃcient form of access regulation, by assuming socially
optimal coordination.
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Term I of Equation (3) corresponds as in the social planning condition (2) to the beneﬁt
of early investment. The term II refers to the real option value of giving up ﬂexibility by
investing early, while term III is the ﬁrst mover advantage of the incumbent. Note that
term II is negative, while term III is positive. By comparing conditions (2) and (3) we
see that private incentives for investment in period 1 are higher than the social incentives
and that the incumbent over-invests. The over-investment of the incumbent is the result
of two factors. Firstly, the incumbent has lower real option value than the social planner.
Secondly, by investing ﬁrst the incumbent receives an additional ﬁrst-mover beneﬁt as it
appears more competitive in the resulting entry and Bertrand stages of the second period.
Indeed, the ﬁrst mover exerts a negative externality on the follower which is internalized
by the social planner but not by the ﬁrst mover.
To correct the private incentives for investment and induce the incumbent to behave
according to the social optimum it is necessary to impose an investment tax TNP on the
incumbent in period 1.
Proposition 3. Nodal pricing will lead to socially optimal investment levels if the incum-
bent pays a ﬁrst period investment tax TNP :
TNP = δ
ˆ ∆c+F
∆c
(CS − d−G) dΦ(G). (4)
This tax is equal to the expected negative externality that early investment imposes on the
entrant minus the positive externality for the TSO.
Proof. The optimal size of the tax should equal the diﬀerence between the private and
the social incentives for investment in period 1, TNP = ∆ΠNP − ∆VSP . This simpliﬁes
to 4. We now show that this tax level is equal to the expected net externality that early
investment imposes on the entrant and the TSO.
If the incumbent invests in period 1, the TSO will collect a merchandising surplus (Cs−
c) whenever G < ∆c, as ﬁrms will compete for transmission access. If the incumbent delays
investments, the TSO will not collect merchandising surplus. Hence, early investments
creates a positive externality for the TSO:
∆TSONP = TSO
Invest
NP − TSOWaitNP = δ
ˆ ∆c
0
(Cs − c)dΦ(G)− 0 > 0.
If the incumbent invests in period 1, the entrant will invest whenever G < ∆c, and
make an operational proﬁt (∆c−G). If the incumbent delays investments, the entrant will
invest more often (whenever G < ∆c + F ) for a higher operational proﬁt (CS − d − G).
Early investments therefore creates a negative externality for the entrant:
∆ENP = E
Invest
NP − EWaitNP = δ
ˆ ∆c
0
(∆c−G) dΦ(G)− δ
ˆ ∆c+F
0
(CS − d−G)dΦ(G) < 0.
The social optimal investment tax is equal to the total expected externality TNP =
∆TSONP + ∆ENP .
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Note that the regulator should commit to a particular investment tax policy before the
realization of the entrant's ﬁxed cost G. This implies that the optimal tax can only be
implemented if the regulator has as good information as the incumbent on the distribution
of the stochastic ﬁxed cost G of the entrant.
3.2 Nodal Pricing with Financial Property Rights
This section extends the nodal pricing model with ﬁnancial transmission rights (FTRs).
The holder of the rights receives the congestion rents if the transmission line is congested.
We ﬁrst derive the investment and bidding equilibrium assuming that the incumbent owns
the ﬁnancial transmission rights (grandfathering). Then we allow the entrant and the
incumbent to bid for the transmission rights at the start of the game (auctioning) and
lastly we look at grandfathering with a secondary market.
3.2.1 Grandfathering
When the incumbent holds ﬁnancial transmission rights, it is not in the position to block
the investment of the entrant in the second period, as the right is purely ﬁnancial. However,
in the cases that the entrant is more eﬃcient and enters the market, the incumbent receives
in equilibrium a compensation that equals the proﬁt it forgoes (due to the investment of
the entrant).
Proposition 4. If the incumbent holds long-term ﬁnancial transmission rights, the incum-
bent will always invest early.
Proof. The bidding game in the second stage is not standard Bertrand as the incumbent
is insured against paying congestion charges and therefore has a non-standard objective
function. On top of operational proﬁts, it receives payments whenever the transmission line
is congested. However, it can be shown that second stage equilibrium bidding strategies are
still Betrand-like.18 If both ﬁrms are present in the market, the incumbent and the entrant
both bid a price equal to the incumbent's marginal cost and the entrant is dispatched.
The incumbent receives a payment (CS − c) from its FTRs and the entrant an operational
proﬁt (∆c). If the incumbent is alone in the market, it will always obtain an operational
and ﬁnancial proﬁt equal to Cs − c.19 If the entrant is alone in the market, it will make a
(per-unit) operational proﬁt Cs − d.
18If both ﬁrms are present, the price in the North is equal to the lowest of the incumbent's bid bI and
the entrant's bid bE , i.e. PN = min{bI , bE}, and the ﬁrm with the lowest bid will be dispatched. The
incumbent's (per-unit) ﬁnancial and operational proﬁts are equal (CS −PN ) and (PN − c)xI respectively,
where xI = 1 if the incumbent is dispatched (bI < bE) and zero otherwise. The operational proﬁts of the
entrant are (PN − d)xE , where xE = 1 if the entrant is dispatched (bE ≤ bI) and zero otherwise. The
entrant will undercut the bid bI of the incumbent, as long as the bid is above its marginal cost bI > d. The
incumbent will undercut the entrant as long at the entrant's bid bE > c. The intersection of the reaction
functions is the Nash equilibrium.
19If the incumbent submits a bid bI , it will obtain a ﬁnancial proﬁt (CS − bI) and an operational proﬁt
(bI − c). Hence the incumbent's proﬁt is independent of its bidding strategy bI .
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We now turn to the entry decisions of the second stage. If the incumbent did invest in
the ﬁrst stage, the entrant will invest in the second stage whenever G < ∆c (as under the
nodal pricing model). If the incumbent did not yet invest in the ﬁrst stage, the incumbent
and the entrant simultaneously decide whether to invest in period 2. By not investing
in the second stage, the incumbent will make zero proﬁt, as it will have no operational
proﬁt and will not collect any ﬁnancial payments either, by lack of competition for the
transmission line. Investing in the second stage is therefore a dominant strategy for the
incumbent which guarantees a second stage proﬁt δ(CS − c − F ). Given the dominant
strategy of the incumbent, the entrant invests whenever G < ∆c.20
As investing in the second period is a dominant strategy for the incumbent, independent
of the realization of G, the incumbent will invest in period 1, as it generates an additional
proﬁt21
∆ΠFTR→I = µ− (1− δ)F (5)
while the irreversibility of investments does not come at a cost.
Comparing the investment incentives under nodal pricing in expression (3) and nodal
pricing with ﬁnancial transmission rights in expression (5) we observe the following: (a) The
real option value of giving up ﬂexibility by investing in period 1 disappears, as investment
levels in the second period are independent of the realization of G, hence, there is no need
to remain ﬂexible. Roughly speaking the ﬁnancial transmission rights provide an insurance
to the incumbent against competition by an eﬃcient entrant.22 (b) The term corresponding
to the ﬁrst mover advantage disappears, because the incumbent is committed to invest in
the second period (even if it did not invest in period 1) by owning a ﬁnancial transmission
right. This commitment eﬀect works as follows: If the incumbent would not invest in the
second period, the ﬁnancial transmission rights would not generate a ﬁnancial surplus (as
there would be no competition for using the transmission line). Hence, the incumbent
enters to increase the value of the ﬁnancial transmission rights.
The addition of ﬁnancial transmission rights weakly lowers total welfare, as the incum-
bent always invests, while it would be optimal to delay investment for some parameter
ranges. Investment taxes can be used to obtain the ﬁrst best also in this setting.23
Proposition 5. In order to correct the investment decisions in the nodal pricing model
with ﬁnancial transmission rights grandfathered to the incumbent, an investment tax needs
to be imposed on the incumbent both in the ﬁrst and in the second stage.
20Note that in the subgame where the incumbent did not invest in period 1, the investment equilibrium
is not eﬃcient as the incumbent enters too often.
21If the incumbent does not invest in period 1, it will have an expected proﬁt ΠWaitFTR→I = δ(CS − c−F ),
while early investments generates a proﬁt ΠInvestFTR→I = µ − F + δ(CS − c). Note that the proﬁts of the
incumbent are independent of G as the FTRs provide perfect insurance.
22If incumbent enters in period 1, the entrant enters in period 2, then the entrant and the incumbent will
compete, and drive up the price for transmission, but the incumbent will receive a ﬁnancial compensation
for this.
23Note that the incumbent receives all the congestion rents on the transmission line through the ﬁnancial
transmission rights. Hence investments decisions no longer create an externality for the TSO, and only
externalities with respect to the entrant have to be considered.
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Proof. If the incumbent did not invest in the ﬁrst stage, it should invest in the second
stage (from a social viewpoint) whenever ∆c + F < G. However, because of the FTRs,
it will always invest in the second stage. In order to correct the second stage incentives
the incumbent should pay tax T 2FTR→I(G) (conditional on not investing in period 1) which
is prohibitively high, whenever the innovative technology is eﬃcient. For instance for any
Tˆ ≥ CS − c − F the following taxation scheme implements socially optimal second stage
investment:
T Period2FTR→I(G) =
{
Tˆ if G < F + ∆c
0 otherwise
As the second stage tax aﬀects the second stage investment equilibrium, it also aﬀects, by
backward induction, ﬁrst stage investment decisions. We indicate the ﬁrst stage contin-
uation pay-oﬀs with a star-subscript. By investing early, the incumbent is guaranteed to
obtain CS − c in the second period independent of the realization of G. Hence proﬁts are
equal to ΠInvestFTR∗ = (µ − F ) + δ(CS − c). By delaying investments, the incumbent receives
an expected proﬁt equal to: ΠWaitFTR∗ = δ
´ G¯
∆c+F
(CS − c − F )dΦ(G) as, given the second
stage investment tax, it will only invest whenever G is suﬃciently high. In order to correct
the investment decisions in stage 1, an expected investment tax can be imposed on the
incumbent equal to:
T Period1FTR→I = (Π
Invest
FTR∗ − ΠWaitFTR∗)−∆VSP
= δ
ˆ ∆c
0
(CS − c)dΦ(G) + δ
ˆ ∆c+F
∆c
(CS − d−G)dΦ(G). (6)
Note that we need two instruments to correct the incentives of the incumbent, one for
each investment period. As the FTRs insure the incumbent against entry, the incumbent
will, ex-post, never regret its investment decisions in the ﬁrst stage, and hence the real
option value is zero. The ﬁrst period tax internalizes the real option value. The FTR only
has a positive value if there is competition in the market. So even if there is no distortion
in the ﬁrst stage, the incumbent always has the incentive to invest in the second period.
This is not socially optimal. The second period tax corrects for this incentive.
3.2.2 Auctioning
We now consider a well functioning primary market in which the FTRs are sold through
an eﬃcient auction before period 1 and both the entrant and the incumbent submit bids.
We study the incentives of both players to buy the FTRs. This implies that we need to
compare their payoﬀs when they hold and do not hold the FTRs. We ﬁrst derive the
market outcome if the entrant obtains all the ﬁnancial transmission rights, then we look
at the bidding process in the ﬁrst stage.
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Proﬁt Entrant Proﬁt Incumbent
FTRs to Entrant EFTR→E = δ
´
(CS − d−G)dΦ(G) ΠFTR→E = 0
FTRs to Incumbent EFTR→I = δ
´ ∆c
0
(∆c−G)dΦ(G) ΠFTR→I = (µ− F ) + δ(CS − c)
Table 1: Continuation pay-oﬀs of the FTR auction.
If the entrant owns the FTRs before period 1, then, it is fully compensated for not
producing in the second period. As the FTRs provide insurance, it now becomes a dominant
strategy for the entrant to always enter the market, whatever the actions of the incumbent
are. The equilibrium is described by the following proposition:
Proposition 6. If the entrant is the holder of FTRs, it always enters the market in period
2 while the incumbent will never invest.
Proof. As in proposition 4 we can derive the bidding equilibrium in the second stage. If
both ﬁrms are present, the entrant will always underbid the incumbent and obtain a total
proﬁt equal to CS−d−G. The incumbent will make zero proﬁt at it is more expensive than
the entrant. If only the incumbent is present, it obtains an operational proﬁt Cs− c, while
the entrant has zero proﬁt (as the FTRs do not generate a payment). If the entrant is alone
in the market it obtains a proﬁt Cs− d−G. Turning to the investment equilibrium in the
second stage, we observe that it is a dominant strategy for the entrant to invest independent
of the realization of G. Hence, the incumbent will never make any operational proﬁt in the
second stage, which also makes investment in stage 1 not worthwhile (as we assume that
ﬁrst period proﬁts are insuﬃcient to pay the investment costs µ < F ). By investing early
the incumbent makes a negative proﬁt ΠInvestFTR→E = (µ− F ) < 0. So, it never invests.24
We are now ready to derive the market equilibrium in the bidding game for ﬁnancial
transmission rights:
Proposition 7. If the incumbent and the entrant bid for ﬁnancial transmission rights in
period 1, then the incumbent will outbid the entrant, obtain the ﬁnancial transmission rights
and invest early whenever
∆VSP + δ
ˆ G
∆c+F
(G−∆c− F )dΦ(G) > 0. (7)
Hence, the incumbent invests early more often than in the social optimum.
Proof. Table (1) reports the continuation pay-oﬀs of the FTR auction, i.e. the expected
proﬁts of obtaining and not obtaining the ﬁnancial transmission rights for the incumbent
and the entrant.
24Late entry by the incumbent is never proﬁtable given the assumption that the incumbent has a higher
marginal cost than the entrant.
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The incumbent will outbid the entrant for the FTRs, (in which case it will invest early)
whenever EFTR→E − EFTR→I < ΠFTR→I − ΠFTR→E. Hence both the incumbent and the
entrant take into account the preemption eﬀect of owning the transmission lines. This
condition simpliﬁes to Equation 7.
The bidding equilibrium between the ﬁrms ensures that the allocation of FTRs is such
that the highest total surplus is generated in the continuation game, i.e. the allocation
is eﬃcient.25 However, eﬃcient allocation in the ﬁrst period cannot avoid ineﬃciencies in
the second period. Whenever the entrant buys the FTRs, it will invest in the period 2
for sure, and the incumbent will not invest at all. However, conditional on the incumbent
not investing in period 1, this investment decision may not be eﬃcient. Indeed, it would
be socially optimal for the entrant not to invest in period 2 when the entrant has high
investment costs: G > F + ∆c. Compared with the social optimal outcome, delaying
investments (by allocating the FTRs to the entrant) leads to an additional expected cost
δ
´ G
∆c+F
(G−∆c− F )dΦ(G). This additional cost makes the incumbent more likely to win
the bidding game than in the social optimum, as expressed by Equation 7.
By imposing an investment tax T = δ
´ G
∆c+F
(G + ∆c − F )dΦ(G) on early investment
by the incumbent, the incumbent's investment decisions will be the same as in the ﬁrst
best. However, without any other policies aﬀecting second stage investment decisions, the
tax will lower total welfare as there will be more ineﬃcient entry by expensive entrants.26
3.2.3 Grandfathering with secondary market
Thus far we assumed that the incumbent is unable to resell the ﬁnancial transmission rights
that were grandfathered to it. By adding a secondary market for transmission rights in the
beginning of stage two this assumption is relaxed. After the realization of the ﬁxed cost
G, the holder of FTRs can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to its competitor for reselling
the FTRs.
Proposition 8. If the incumbent has all bargaining power in the secondary market, grand-
fathering FTRs to the incumbent is socially eﬃcient.
Proof. We solve the game by backward induction. First, suppose that the incumbent
has not yet invested in period 1, then the continuation pay-oﬀs in the secondary market
are given by Table 2.a. The incumbent will resell the FTRs to the entrant whenever
EFTR→E − EFTR→I > ΠFTR→I , which simpliﬁes to G < ∆c + F . Hence second period
eﬃciency is restored. If the incumbent has all bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-
25The bidding condition EFTR→E − EFTR→I < ΠFTR→I − ΠFTR→E is equivalent to EFTR→E +
ΠFTR→E < EFTR→I + ΠFTR→I . Note that with FTRs the network operator is not allowed to keep
any congestion revenues, and hence there are no externalities with respect to third parties.
26More precisely, it lowers total welfare for the range of parameters where investment decisions are
aﬀected by the tax.
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a. Incumbent did not invest in period 1 Proﬁt Entrant Proﬁt Incumbent
FTRs to Entrant EFTR→E = δ(CS − d−G) ΠFTR→E = 0
FTRs to Incumbent EFTR→I = δmax{∆c−G, 0} ΠFTR→I = δ(CS − c− F )
b. Incumbent invested in period 1 Proﬁt Entrant Proﬁt Incumbent
FTRs to Entrant EFTR→E = δ(Cs − d−G) ΠFTR→E = µ− F
FTRs to Incumbent EFTR→I = δmax{∆c−G, 0} ΠFTR→I = (µ− F ) + δ(CS − c)
Table 2: Continuation pay-oﬀs of the FTR secondary market conditional on the incumbent
investing in period 1 (top) or not (bottom).
leave-it oﬀer, it will receive a payment P from the entrant: 27
P =

δ(Cs − c) if G < ∆c
δ(Cs − d−G) if F + ∆c > G > ∆c
no trade otherwise
Second, suppose the incumbent has already invested in stage 1, then the continuation pay-
oﬀs are given by Table 2.b. The incumbent will resell the FTRs to the entrant whenever
EFTR→E−EFTR→I > ΠFTR→I . When the entrant has high investment costs G > ∆c trade
will not take place. When they are low, G ≤ ∆c, there are no gains from trade, and the
ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between trading and not trading.
Including the resale value P of the ﬁnancial transmission rights and with early invest-
ment, the incumbent obtains proﬁt:
ΠInvestFTR→I = (µ− F ) + δ(CS − c),
and with delayed investments:
ΠWaitFTR→I = δ(CS − c− F ) + δ
ˆ ∆c
0
(CS − c)− (CS − c− F ) dΦ(G)
+ δ
ˆ ∆c+F
∆c
(CS − d−G)− (CS − c− F ) dΦ(G) (8)
where the second and the third term include the resale value of the FTRs.
The incumbent will invest in period 1 whenever
∆ΠSecondaryFTR→I = Π
Invest
FTR→I − ΠWaitFTR→I = ∆VSP ≥ 0,
which is identical to the social planner's outcome in equation 2.
27Assuming that the entrant would have all the bargaining power the price would be: P = CS − c− F .
Trade would take place whenever G < ∆c+ F .
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The existence of the secondary market makes the incumbent to internalize the impact
of its ﬁrst period's investment investment decision on the entrant's expected proﬁt. Hence,
private and social incentives coincide through the potential trade of the rights at the
secondary market at a price decided by the incumbent.
Note that if the FTRs are auctioned before period 1 instead of being grandfathered, then
the incumbent weakly outbids the entrant. Hence, both an auction and/or grandfathering
of the rights to the incumbent leads to the same eﬃcient outcome.28
3.3 Physical Property Rights
This section present the market equilibrium with a physical property rights approach, an
alternative to nodal pricing with ﬁnancial transmission rights. Although not practically
implementable in the power market, those results provide a useful benchmark. The physical
property rights are assumed to be grandfathered to the incumbent in stage 1, and oﬀered
by the incumbent with a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer on a secondary market in the beginning
of period 2.29
Proposition 9. In a model with Physical Transmission Rights with a secondary market,
investments levels are eﬃcient.
Proof. First, suppose that the incumbent invests in stage 1. It will resell the PTRs to the
entrant for a payment equal δ(Cs−d−G) if this payment is larger than the proﬁt obtained
by holding to the PTR, δ(Cs − c). Hence trade will take place and the entrant invests
whenever it is socially optimal (G < ∆c). The proﬁt of the incumbent for investing early
is equal to
ΠInvestPTR→I = µ− F + δ
ˆ ∆c
0
(CS − d−G)dΦ(G) + δ
ˆ G¯
∆c
(CS − c)dΦ(G).
Second, suppose that the incumbent did not invest in stage 1. Now it will resell the
PTRs to the entrant for a payment equal to δ(Cs−d−G) if this payment is larger than the
28Note that the payoﬀs of the entrant when the incumbent is the holder of the rights are EInvsetFTR→I =
EWaitFTR→I = δ
´ ∆c
0
(∆c−G)dΦ(G). When the entrant is the holder of the rights (with full bargaining power
in the secondary market), the incumbent never invests in period 1 as it expects to have zero proﬁt in the
second period and therefore it is unable to cover the sunk cost of the investment. Therefore the relevant
payoﬀ for the entrant in this case is: EWaitFTR→E = δ(CS − d − G) + δ
´ G
∆c
(G − ∆c)dΦ(G), while for the
incumbent we have ΠWaitFTR→E = 0. Whenever, Π
Invest
FTR→I < Π
Wait
FTR→I , both the incumbent and the entrant
have the same valuations for the rights and submit equal bids: EWaitFTR→E−EWaitFTR→I = ΠWaitFTR→I−ΠWaitFTR→E .
When ΠInvestFTR→I > Π
Wait
FTR→I , the incumbent outbids the entrant and gets the rights: E
Wait
FTR→E−EInvestFTR→I <
ΠInvestFTR→I −ΠWaitFTR→E .
29If the rights would be auctioned in stage 1, the incumbent would (weakly) outbid the entrant, as it
has additional beneﬁts from accessing the transmission line in period one. Therefore the results derived in
this section would remain valid.
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proﬁt of holding on to the PRT, δ(Cs − c− F ). Trade takes place whenever G < ∆c+ F .
The proﬁt of the incumbent is equal to
ΠWaitPTR→I = δ
ˆ ∆c+F
0
(CS − d−G)dΦ(G) + δ
ˆ G¯
∆c+F
(CS − c− F )dΦ(G).
The incumbent invests early if ∆ΠPTR→I = ΠInvestPTR→I − ΠWaitPTR→I = ∆VSP ≥ 0, which is
equal to the ﬁrst best investment level.
The incumbent as a holder of PTRs fully internalizes the impact of its early investment
to the entrant. Again this occurs through the secondary market and the resale of the rights
to the entrant when the latter is eﬃcient and enters the market.
Note that if the PTRs are sold initially through an auction, then the incumbent weakly
outbids the entrant and gets the rights, so, grandathering the rights to the incumbent or
seelling them through an eﬃcient auction is equavalent for achieving the socially eﬃcient
outcome.30
4 Surplus sharing in secondary market
4.1 Grandfathering with secondary market
So far we assumed that the incumbent, could make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer in the sec-
ondary market, and, therefore, had all bargaining power and internalized the full real
option value. If instead the incumbent leaves a fraction β ∈ [0, 1] of the gains from trade
in the secondary market to the entrant, it internalizes less, and is more likely to invest
early.31 In particular, with interim trade and grandfathering of transmission rights, the
incumbent will invest early in period 1 when
∆ΠTR = µ− (1− δ)F︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
− (1− β)δ
[ˆ ∆c
0
F dΦ(G) +
ˆ ∆c+F
∆c
(F + ∆c−G) dΦ(G)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
.
independent whether trading FTRs or PTRs. Note that for β = 0 this expressions con-
verges to the ﬁrst best and for β = 1 to the grandfathered FTRs without a secondary
market. With less bargaining power, the incumbent will invest early more often.
Comparing this expression with the investment under nodal pricing without ﬁnancial
transmission rights (equation 3), one can determine in which cases transmission rights
(with secondary market) might improve investment eﬃciency. In both situations, the
30Note that when the entrant is the holder of the PTRs the incumbent never invests in period 1.
Moreover, it is ΠWaitPTR→I = E
Wait
PTR→E , so when the incumbent does not invest early, it has the same
valuation with the entrant for the rights. Whenever, investment in period 1 is socially optimal, we have
ΠInvestPTR→I > Π
Wait
PTR→I and therefore, the incumbent weakly outbids the entrant.
31Surplus sharing requires bargaining between the two generators over the price of the rights. We focus
on the case that bargaining is eﬃcient ex-post and the outcome lies on the Pareto frontier.
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incumbent might invest too early, but for diﬀerent reasons: Under nodal pricing, over-
investment is due to a ﬁrst mover advantage, and not fully internalizing the real option
value for intermediate cost realizations (∆c < G < ∆c + F ). This size of the distortion is
determined by the investment externality
ˆ ∆c+F
∆c
(CS − d−G) dΦ(G). (9)
With a secondary market for ﬁnancial transmission rights without full bargaining power for
the incumbent, only a fraction 1−β of the real option value is captured by the incumbent.
The distortion is then equal to
β
[ˆ ∆c
0
F dΦ(G) +
ˆ ∆c+F
∆c
(F + ∆c−G) dΦ(G)
]
. (10)
We can combine both expressions to determine when ﬁnancial transmission rights are
welfare improving.32 If the incumbent captures only a small fraction of the value of trade,
that is β is larger than a critical value βˆ
β > β̂ =
´ ∆c+F
∆c
(CS − d−G) dΦ(G)´ ∆c
0
F dΦ(G) +
´ ∆c+F
∆c
(F + ∆c−G) dΦ(G)
, then introducing transmission rights will reduce welfare as the second distortion will
outweigh the ﬁrst one.
By rewriting the expression for βˆ one can derive that a critical value β̂ ≤ 1 exists if
the ﬁrst mover advantage CS − c− F under nodal pricing (i.e. deterring entry when G is
intermediate) is smaller than the sunk cost F when the entry cannot be deterred because
the entrant is too eﬃcient (G < ∆c):
ˆ ∆c+F
∆c
(CS − c− F ) dΦ(G) <
ˆ ∆c
0
F dΦ(G)
Hence, ﬁnancial transmission rights will increase welfare for sure if the production cost
diﬀerence is small (∆c→ 0), the equilibrium price in the South CS is large and production
cost of the entrant are likely to be intermediate (higher ﬁrst mover advantage).
4.2 Auctioning
In this partial bargaining power analysis, we have assumed so far that the rights are
grandfathered to the incumbent and we concluded that the incumbent overinvests. If
instead we have an eﬃcient auction for the rights which takes place before period 1 and
in which both the incumbent and the entrant participate, the welfare increases as private
32Conditional on ﬁrst stage entry, second stage investment decisions are optimal in both situations.
Hence we only need to compare ﬁrst period investment decisions.
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incentives for investment coincide with the social ones. So, auction leads to a more eﬃcient
outcome than grandfathering when we drop oﬀ the assumption of the take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer in the secondary market.
Proposition 10. If the holder of long term transmission rights (either ﬁnancial or physi-
cal) has only partial bargaining power in the secondary market, auctioning the rights in the
primary market leads to socially eﬃcient investment levels.
Proof. The incumbent will outbid the entrant in the primary auction for the FTRs when his
valuation for obtaining the rights, ΠFTR→I−ΠFTR→E, is larger than the entrant's valuation
EFTR→E−EFTR→I , where Π and E are the continuation pay-oﬀs for the incumbent and the
entrant respectively. This implies that the incumbent will buy the property rights if and
only if allocating the rights to the incumbent creates a larger joint expected continuation
surplus than allocating them to the entrant, ΠFTR→I+EFTR→I > ΠFTR→E+EFTR→E. Note
that as the network operator does not obtain any congestion rents once the transmission
rights are allocated, the joint continuation surplus of the incumbent and the entrant is
equal to total social surplus in the continuation game. The negotiation in the secondary
market for the property rights is ex-post eﬃcient. This means, that conditional on the
incumbent's investment decision in stage 1, the incumbent and the entrant will maximize
their joint surplus Π + E when they trade in the secondary market, and decide about
their investments. The joint surplus of the continuation game is given by the following
expression:
Π + E =
(µ− F ) + δ
(
CS − c+
´ ∆c
0
(∆c−G)dΦ(G)
)
if I invests,
δ
[´ ∆c+F
0
(CS − d−G) dΦ(G) +
´ G¯
∆c+F
(CS − c− F )dΦ(G)
]
if I waits.
(11)
The incumbent and the entrant will obtain each a share of this joint surplus. The size of
their share depends on the bargaining factor β and on the allocation of the property rights in
the primary stage. Total surplus Π+E would be maximized if the incumbent would invest
whenever the ∆VSP > 0. Any deviation from the socially optimal investment rule will lead
to a lower level of total surplus. As the incumbent does not fully internalize the entrant's
proﬁts, it only takes into account private investment incentives ∆Π = ΠInvest − ΠWait
and investments are therefore socially sub-optimal. It can be shown that for any level of
intermediate bargaining β ∈ (0, 1), the incumbent will invest more than socially optimal if
the incumbent obtained the rights in the primary market, and less than socially optimal
if the entrant obtained those rights. That is the incumbent's investment incentives are
ranked as follows:
∆ΠFTR→I > ∆VSP > ∆ΠFTR→E
. We can now check the following four situations, which could be depending on the param-
eters of the game could occur:
1. ∆ΠFTR→I > ∆VSP > ∆ΠFTR→E > 0. The incumbent will invest early, independent
of the allocation of the FTRs. Hence, the Incumbent and the Entrant have identical
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valuation for the FTRs, as total surplus Π + E is the same. In the primary market
they obtain the right with 50% probability.
2. ∆ΠFTR→I > ∆VSP > 0 > ∆ΠFTR→E. The incumbent will only invest early if it
obtained the property rights in the primary market. Early investment is socially
optimal (∆VSP > 0) and hence total market surplus Π + E is maximized if the
incumbent obtains the rights. As the auction in the ﬁrst stage allocate the FTR such
that the joint continuation payoﬀ is maximized, the incumbent will obtain the rights,
and the outcome is socially eﬃcient.
3. ∆ΠFTR→I > 0 > ∆VSP > ∆ΠFTR→E. The incumbent will only invest early if it
obtains the property rights. It is socially optimal to wait, hence total surplus is
higher in case the rights are allocated to the entrant, and therefore the entrant will
outbid the incumbent. In equilibrium the incumbent will wait, and the outcome is
socially eﬃcient.
4. 0 > ∆ΠFTR→I > ∆VSP > ∆ΠFTR→E. The incumbent will always wait to invest in
the ﬁrst period independent of the allocation of the FTRs. This is also socially opti-
mal. The incumbent and the entrant will have identical valuations for the property
rights, and in the primary market they both have a 50% probability for obtaining
the property FTRs.
Hence in all four cases, total surplus is maximized. For physical transmission rights the
proof is analogue.
The competitive initial allocation of the long-term transmission rights guarantees eﬃ-
ciency, independent of how the trading surplus in the secondary market is shared between
the seller and the buyer of the rights. Hence, a combination of a competitive initial allo-
cation with a well functioning secondary market leads to an eﬃcient outcome. Auctioning
the initial rights is (weakly) preferred to grandfathering to the incumbent as it generates
a higher surplus if the incumbent cannot extract the full trading surplus.
5 Conclusions
We study the dynamic eﬃciency of several types of access regulation of a bottleneck trans-
mission line in electricity markets. The current practice of organizing short-term markets
for those bottlenecks, leads to premature investments by brown incumbent generators
because they want to exploit their ﬁrst-mover advantage. We show that long-term trans-
mission rights may restore dynamic eﬃciency. However, this always requires the presence
of a secondary market. Without one, the situation will actually be worse than without
long-term rights. Investments are eﬃcient in two situations. (1) The brown incumbent has
full bargaining power in the secondary market: In that case the incumbent fully internal-
izes the eﬀects of its investment timing on the entrant's pay-oﬀ. (2) The initial allocation
of the property rights is competitive and the entrant is an active bidder in the primary
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market. This would require that the green entrant has suﬃcient information about the
evolution of future investment costs.33
Instead of introducing long-term property rights, regulators could, in theory, restore
eﬃciency by imposing an investment tax on early investment by the incumbent. In order
to determine the optimal tax level, the regulator would require information about the like-
lihood that the investment costs of the green entrant are of intermediate value. We do not
believe that this information is readily available, and therefore we prefer the introduction of
long-term property rights to taxation instruments. To implement this mechanism, regula-
tors can choose between ﬁnancial and physical transmission rights. We show that eﬃciency
is achieved with both types of rights. However, as ﬁnancial rights do not raise concerns
regarding strategic withholding of transmission capacity (Joskow and Tirole, 2000), they
are our the preferred option. Note that long-term property rights have additional beneﬁts
which were not explicitly considered in this paper: They allow risk-averse ﬁrms to hedge
risks, and provide additional information about the value of network expansion to the
network operator.
We study a market in which local pockets with market power supply energy to a large
competitive market. Competitive pricing is a reasonable assumption for the long-term
equilibrium of a large liberalized market without signiﬁcant entry barriers. Obviously,
with an additional market failure (market power in the South), the relative eﬃciency of
scenarios will change. Early investments in the North will limit market power abuse in
the South and increase allocative eﬃciency.34 However, persistent problems of market
power should be solved by policies that address them directly (for instance structural and
behavioral remedies such as divestitures and bid caps) and not indirectly by network access
regulation. Modeling those additional market failures and the preferred policies is outside
the scope of the paper.
33There is some anecdotal evidence that green energy companies in Belgium were suﬃciently forward
looking as to sign exclusivity agreements with land owners in good wind locations (high wind speeds, close
to the grid, and away from nature reserves and residential areas) many years before actually building any
wind turbine.
34For instance, if there is a monopoly producer in the South, the price in the South will be pWaitS =
arg max(p − CS)D(p), without investments in the North and pInvestS = arg max(p − CS)(D(p) −K) with
investments. Clearly, early investment in the North aligns prices in the South to marginal cost pWaitS >
pInvestS > CS .
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